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A COHESION PACT FOR THE REGIONS: A ROLE FOR 
INDUSTRIAL POLICY?  
 
Leslie Budd1
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The Lisbon Agenda of 2000 and the supporting Sapir and Kok Reports have set 
the parameters of economic policy in the European Union (EU) in the medium 
term. The asymmetric regime of economic governance locks manifold regions 
and industries into an inflexible and unbalanced policy environment so that the 
objectives of Lisbon may be difficult to achieve.  The monetary straitjacket of the 
€uro, buttressed by the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact 
(SGP) fiscal conditions, limits the degree to which competitiveness and cohesion 
may be delivered, particularly in an expanded Union. This paper explores these 
issues of economic governance in the EU in order to investigate the possibility of 
a ‘cohesion pact for the regions’ which places a more comprehensive industrial 
policy as the fulcrum for achieving a better balance between growth and 
cohesion. Operating within an Open Method of Co-Ordination (OMC) framework 
and by linking industrial policy instruments to a system of fiscal federalism, a 
more flexible and balanced regime of economic governance may ensue, one in 
which the ambitious objectives of the Lisbon Agenda may start to be  achieved or 
at least moved towards more efficaciously.   
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INTRODUCTION 
The European Union expanded to twenty seven Member States on 1st January 
2007. At the same time Slovenia became the first Accession State to adopt the 
€uro as its currency, thereby joining the single currency area, known as the €uro-
Area.  The future shape and direction of the EU is beyond the scope of this 
paper, but the very notion of integrating twenty seven countries with varying 
capacities, competences, industrial and spatial structures as well as path 
dependencies is a challenging one.  As the EU has expanded, its system of 
economic governance has become more asymmetric. Key institutions and 
policies have developed that are in conflict with other. For example, the agendas 
of competitiveness and cohesion have been and are enabled by different 
components of the EU’s economic governance. For example, the EU’s growth 
agenda is driven by the rhetoric of the Lisbon Agenda of 2000 to make the EU 
the most dynamic knowledge economy in the world by 2010 and rests in large 
part on the completion of the Single European Market (SEM) and the efficient 
operation of the single currency area, the Euro-Area (European Council, 2000).  
On the other hand, the difficulty of managing the enlargement of the EU to 
include states from Central and Eastern Europe suggests that strengthening 
cohesion policy remains an imperative.  
The reform of the EU’s Cohesion Plan for the period 2007-2013 focuses 
on strategic priorities whilst at the same time seeking to address inequality 
between regions. The reification of the region and territorial solidarity, however, 
overlooks the role of industrial policy in the distribution of resources to sustain 
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localities and regions that lag the others.  Conventionally the purpose of industrial 
policy in the EU is to help achieve the strategic priorities of sustaining growth and 
the global competitiveness of EU industries.  The regional dimension to cohesion 
policy and industrial policy appear to run counter to the two major reports 
undertaken on behalf of the President of the European Commission (the Sapir 
and Kok Reports, 2002, 2004a) which attempt to re-focus economic and social 
cohesion at the national level.  
Industrial policy in the EU appears to be caught between the rock of 
enterprise policy and the hard place of competitiveness policy.  On of the one 
hand, enterprise policy appears to have displaced industrial policy in the 
discourse and policy programmes of EU decision-makers until very recently, 
whilst on the other hand pursuing the mantra of global competitiveness rather 
than focusing on the capabilities and path dependencies of different territories.   
At the same time, cohesion policy focuses on territorial solidarity without explicit 
reference to differing economic and industrial structures, and thus the role of 
industrial policy in facilitating cohesion.   In other words, the relative neglect of 
industrial policy within the EU has tended to reinforce the asymmetric nature of 
economic governance in the EU. Competitiveness policy is led by the Lisbon 
Agenda, enterprise policy seeks to extend liberalisation within the Single 
European Market down to the level of the firm, whilst cohesion policy seeks to 
overcome inequalities across different EU regions.  It therefore seems apparent 
that industrial policy has the potential at least to act an important fulcrum in 
integrating these policies. 
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The system of economic governance in the EU is a powerful brew if one 
considers its main ingredients: 
• Completing the Single European Market (SEM) in the context of the EU 
fulfilling its obligations to the World Trade Organisation (WTO). 
• Management of  Euro-Area  macroeconomic policy, founded in part on the 
Maastricht Treaty rules (Buiter 2006) and the constraints of the Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP) which  restrict the use of fiscal activism  to ameliorate the 
effects of industrial and regional shocks;  
• Enlargement to twenty seven Member States. 
• The poor pace of implementing the Lisbon Agenda in balancing growth and 
cohesion agendas. 
This institutional and policy brew may become more unstable as its ingredients 
combine less well because of the asymmetric nature of economic governance.  
For example, monetary policy is set at the EU level with consequent problems for 
the transmission of an EU-wide uniform policy at different territorial scales that 
have varying path dependencies (Budd 1997, Sunley and Martin, 2006,). The 
economic logic of Maastricht and the SGP as regimes of economic governance 
means that their rules are still relatively poor in managing the effects of 
asymmetric external shocks that impact on sectors and regions. Moreover, the 
endogeneity of the €uro monetary regime leads to the asymmetric absorption of 
uniform policy in these different territories (Budd, 2006, Buiter, 2006). Fiscal 
policies are set nationally and regional policy has arguably become effectively 
nationalised (that is, set at national levels), whilst expenditure on ensuring 
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regional cohesion has become part of a sub-set of national mechanisms of the 
transmission of uniform monetary policy within fragmented national fiscal regimes 
(Fatas, 1998). That is, Member States still manage fiscal policy and operate its 
institutions, but expenditure and taxation systems and the degree of their 
devolution to lower levels of government vary between Member States. In this 
regard, cohesion policy merely acts to manage the distribution of funds to under-
performing regions, whilst not permitting the development of institutions to 
support local and regional fiscal discretion.  
A system of fiscal federalism, as the keystone of a ’cohesion pact for the 
regions’ may fill this void. Currently, the asymmetric economic governance of the 
EU inhibits this possibility because the regulations pertaining to the completion of 
the SEM impact on the operation of cohesion policy. Similarly, the conditions of 
entry for new and potential Members states lock them into a development path of 
liberalisation, privatisation and minimising state intervention, in the form of fiscal 
instruments, to overcome sectoral and regional differences, often in anticipation 
of joining the Euro-Area. By suggesting a ’cohesion pact for the regions’, this 
paper addresses some of these problems in the context of an explicit recognition 
of the role of industrial policy in balancing economic growth and cohesion in 
order to achieve some regional balance in the EU’s economic development. 
 
THE BUILDING BLOCK OF EURO-AREA FISCAL REFORM 
      As one of the core elements of economic governance of the EU, the 
management of the €uro can appear to be somewhat distant from the 
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development and performance of the real economies of the Member States, 
particularly sectors and constituent regions. The Sapir and Kok Reports have 
both noted the importance of a more flexible fiscal regime in achieving the 
objectives of the Lisbon Agenda.  A re-setting of macroeconomic policies, 
underpinned by the rules and institutions governing the €uro, would close this 
distance and add a degree of flexibility that is currently missing.  It is apparent 
that any regional cohesion pact will have a reformed Euro-Area currency system 
at its heart, particularly if industrial policy is to be the fulcrum of balancing 
cohesion and competitiveness.  Industrial policy will not be able to undertake this 
function if the current EU fiscal rigidity remains which places limits on the ability 
of Member States to fund policy measures and instruments.   
At the heart of the Euro-Area management system are the Maastricht Treaty 
rules, with the implementation and operation of these rules reinforced by the 
(reformed) SGP which supposedly disciplines Member States deemed to be in 
breach of the excessive deficit rules. The Maastricht Treaty conditions for 
membership of the Euro-Area set limits on inflation rates, interest rates and 
exchange rate variability as part of monetary policy. Limits on fiscal policy are in 
the form of budget deficit ceilings and a maxima on total public debt. There is 
built-in asymmetry to this system in that monetary policy is set at the EU-level, by 
the operations of the European Central Bank (ECB), whilst fiscal policy remains 
within the remit of the Member States. 
 One of the most virulent critics of the “Maastricht numerology” is the 
economist Willem Buiter. He claims that it represents “economic nonsense” 
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(Buiter, 2003). That is, the fiscal rules are not based on sound economic theory 
or policy practice but influenced by the political problem of managing “excessive” 
fiscal deficits that are deemed to be potentially inflationary. Effectively, this 
concern masks an ideological position over the role of public expenditure in a 
market economy. The claim of “economic nonsense” appears to have borne out 
by events since the inception of the €uro (Budd 2007, Buiter 2006). 
  The €uro has established its credentials as a favoured denominated 
currency for financial asset classes in many but not all parts of the world and its 
management has apparently curbed inflationary expectations in the Euro-Area.  
However, the imposition of a one-size fits all monetary policy for the Euro-Area 
economies has caused difficulties for the management of economic policy and 
economic governance in a number of Members States, (von Hagen, 2006, 
National Institute Economic Review 2006b). Moreover, the present design of the 
€uro’s governance lacks one important element.  In the theory of optimal 
currency areas, on which the €uro is partially based, fiscal transfers are needed 
to compensate for inequalities in income and employment within a monetary 
union in the absence of mobility of capital and labour (Mundell, 1961).  
  In some accounts the combination of the SGP and re-distributive policies 
at the EU level (for example, cohesion policy) compensate for this omission 
(Boschma, 2000). A limited EU budget, however, within an asymmetrical system 
of macroeconomic policy restricts the scale and scope of this compensation. 
Moreover, asymmetric external shocks (affecting constituent industries and 
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regions differently) cannot easily be absorbed by a uniform monetary policy of an 
economic union with manifold capacities and characteristics.   
   Most of the evidence suggests that greater economic integration, as 
embodied in the SEM, will reduce the regional effects of the transmission of 
monetary policy in a monetary union, whereas greater industrial specialisation 
will increase these effects (Krugman, 1993, Arnold, 1999).  This outcome 
suggests that any proposal for a ’cohesion pact for the regions’ should 
incorporate industrial policy as one of its principal components.  The tension 
between greater integration and regional industrial specialisation also reinforces 
demands for a consideration of fiscal federalism to “balance” the Euro-Area 
economy.   
   Fiscal federalism is a system of governmental transfers that enable sub-
national governmental authorities to manage the impact of the business cycle 
and external shocks on their localised economies. There are two aspects to fiscal 
federalism that correspond to the two roles of government: stabilisation and 
distribution (Musgrave and Musgrave, 1959). Writing back in 1965, in respect of 
European economic integration, Musgrave (1965: 2) noted: 
Across the Atlantic, fiscal thinking in multi-unit terms has been stimulated 
by the movement for European economic integration. There the problem is 
one of rearranging and synchronizing the tax structure of associated 
countries so that economic frontiers can be eliminated and efficiency gains 
from tax reduction can be realized without being offset by distorting tax 
differentials.  
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 The development of the €uro, notwithstanding, some forty years on this remains 
a key problem for the economic governance of the EU. The institutional basis for 
promoting fiscal federalism is reinforced by sound theoretical work (Musgrave, 
1965). The combination of the theory of social wants, whereby the market cannot 
satisfy or distribute certain wants optimally over space, while individual 
preferences can differ between areas, means that forms of fiscal federalism can 
contribute to efficient outcomes in the distribution of social goods. The efficient 
provision of these goods thereby contributes to the competences of a region and 
relates to the depth of its institutional embeddedness2. It can be argued that both 
factors can operate as regional stabilisers in dealing with asymmetric shocks 
associated with different industrial specialisations in different regions. Moreover, 
a system of fiscal federalism could make a significant contribution to cohesion 
policy by re-balancing its relationship to competitiveness policy. 
        A system of fiscal federalism would also facilitate reforms of the EU 
budgetary process in favour of ear-marked funds (growth, re-structuring and 
convergence), as proposed by Sapir as part of cohesion policy.  Moreover, 
locating a set of financial instruments to support industrial policy within this 
proposed system may help overcome some of the asymmetries of economic 
governance of the EU. These funds could be hypothecated3 for certain objectives 
of industrial policy, particularly in regions whose industries face restructuring or 
large plant closures. The Sapir proposals for growth, restructuring and 
convergence funds have some merits in making EU budgetary policy more 
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flexible  but the difficulty remains in assessing the boundaries of each fund. The 
other problem is that these funds are set within a national rather than regional 
framework and an explicit acceptance of the growth/competitiveness agenda. A 
system of fiscal federalism that contains a degree of hypothecation for industrial 
policy could provide the basis of making the Open Method of Co-ordination 
(OMC) the policy vehicle for re-balancing economic policy. 
 The OMC is an increasingly important dimension of the mode of 
governance in the EU. Formally introduced as part of Lisbon, it builds on the 
Broad Economic Policy Guidelines and the European Employment Strategy. The 
main objective is to co-ordinate rather than harmonise national policies and it 
consists of “soft law” mechanisms underpinned by hard regulations, for example 
SGP, benchmarking best practice, and mutual learning. The stress is on 
openness and flexibility in order to compare national approaches and drawing 
together policy makers at different scales of government.  Since 2001, it has 
been extended to other policy domains, including enterprise policy, structural 
economic reform and social Inclusion. It therefore appears to be a salient 
framework for incorporating more flexible economic governance, industrial policy 
and cohesion into ’cohesion pact for the regions’. 
 
THE BUILDING BLOCKS OF COHESION POLICY 
The EU’s cohesion policy is summarised by the Commission’s Third Report on 
economic and social cohesion (EC, 2004b; 1): 
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….major socio-economic disparities between the Member States and 
between regions persist. These gaps in wealth and dynamism arise from 
structural deficiencies in certain key factors for competitiveness such as 
investment in physical infrastructure, innovation and human resources. 
The Member States and the regions therefore require support from the 
Community policies to overcome their handicaps”  
 
For the reform period, 2007-2013 the EC has proposed that cohesion policy 
should be: 
• More targeted on the EU’s strategic priorities (Lisbon and Gothenburg 
agendas for a sustainable and competitive ‘knowledge economy’, 
European employment strategy); 
• More concentrated on the least favoured regions while anticipating change 
in the rest of the Union; 
• More decentralised with a simpler, more transparent  and more efficient 
implantation; 
Cohesion policy continues to consist of the three building blocks of the EDRF, 
the ESF, and the Cohesion Fund. The ERDF was established in 1975, and its 
resources are mainly used to co-finance investment that boosts production, 
employment stability and job creation or maintenance, as well as infrastructure 
and small and medium sized enterprise development in the poorest regions.  The 
ESF focuses on creating and maintaining employment opportunities, particularly 
business start-ups, and boosting female labour market participation. Created in 
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1957, the ESF is the EU's main source of financial support for efforts to develop 
employability and human resources. Total funds for the 2007-13 period are 
€336.1bn at 2006 prices. Since 1994, the Cohesion Fund has assisted Member 
States in enabling investment in transport infrastructure and environmental 
management so as to reduce socio-economic disparities in regions with less than 
90% of the average EU Gross National Income (GNI) per head.  In total, the 
funds to implement EU cohesion policy represent a third of the Community 
Budget and 0.46% of EU GNI. 
Cohesion policy is tied to the governmental function of addressing economic 
inequality, albeit at the EU level. In combination with allocating national funds for 
providing public goods and merits goods, for example education and health, the 
Member States are able to manage the consequences of economic shocks and 
market failure. However, EU cohesion policy embeds the supply-side market 
adjustment perspective of Lisbon within the current system of economic 
governance. Moreover, it ignores both demand factors and interaction with the 
macroeconomic role of government.  In particular, the impact of changes in 
demand on key industries open to international competition in EU regions does 
not feature as a central concern of cohesion policy. In this respect industrial 
policy should be a parameter and not a variable in the construction and operation 
of cohesion policy. Unfortunately the hegemony of a competitiveness agenda 
distorts the role of cohesion policy balancing the impact of the cyclical and 
structural change in the EU economies and regions.   
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THE ‘SHADOW’ OF LISBON 
     Cohesion policy can be seen as a counterpart to the growth and 
competitiveness agenda of the EU, embodied in the Lisbon Agenda and its 
subsequent amendments. The objective is to stimulate economic growth in order 
to realise the true capacity of the EU whilst at the same time distributing the 
benefits to underperforming regions. The rhetoric or even propaganda of Lisbon 
counterbalances competitiveness and cohesion. Yet the emphasis on the former 
in delivering growth effectively relegates the latter to an externality that arises 
from the benefits of developing the knowledge economy in the EU.  One can say 
that the logic of current cohesion policy (arising out of Lisbon) is based on growth 
trickling down to poorer regions.  From the literature on economic development, 
however, it is fair to say that this approach has been found wanting (Rostow, 
1960, Parr 1999).  This conclusion is reinforced if one observes the small scale 
of trickle down from growth poles to poorer regions; see for example recent 
experience in China, (Asian Development Bank, 2006). It also contradicts 
conventional theory of the state which posits a threefold role based on the 
functions of: 
Allocation: Combating market failure through the optimal provision of social 
goods and the creation of technological and pecuniary externalities; 
Distribution: Combating the non-optimal distribution of income and wealth using 
the tax and benefit system. The provision of merits goods and use 
of the public budget also form part of this role;  
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Stabilisation: Using fiscal and monetary policies to influence the desired rate of 
growth, employment, price stability and terms of trade. 
 Clearly these roles can come into conflict with each other. There is a symbiotic 
connection however, whereby one role is not superior to any other (Musgrave 
and Musgrave, 1958).  
  The challenge for EU and Member State policy makers is to identify which 
roles of the state should be reproduced by the Lisbon Agenda.  One criticism is 
that the Lisbon Agenda explicitly ascribes superior status to the stabilisation role 
of the state.  This criticism appears to be confirmed by the Sapir and Kok Reports 
(Sapir et al, 2002, Dunford, 2005, Gardiner et al, 2005). The other key challenge 
for the economic governance of the EU is whether the EU should be considered 
a unitary economy, shaped to some extent by the material outcomes associated 
with Lisbon. Lisbon and its antecedents, Sapir and Kok, appear to be driven by 
the apparent evidence of the EU’s inferior productivity performance (and thus its 
potential to achieve optimal levels of growth) compared to that of the US. 
Unpacking the evidence and the causal factors and effects of this “inferiority” 
creates a more complex picture, as noted by Dunford (2005) and Gardener et al 
(2005), because of structural and cultural factors. 
Underlying much of the growth agenda in the EU and elsewhere is an 
over-adherence to an Anglo-Saxon structural adjustment model of economic 
development that suggests the primacy of markets as the only rational response 
to overcoming regional differences. Within this kind of model, any lack of regional 
coherence is a function of market imperfections rather than differences in 
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economic, industrial and spatial structures and different path dependencies, not 
to say policy failure. In this context, policy interventions are meant to operate to 
make markets function more efficiently. Moreover, any industrial policy becomes 
subservient to competition policy.  It appears to follow that regional policy, in the 
guise of EU cohesion policy, operates in the realm of limited distribution rather 
than allocation and stabilisation. 
The strategic priorities of Lisbon are to boost EU growth above its long-
term rates,  and to achieve a 70% employment rate within a framework of 
developing a information society in which enterprise thrives (European Council, 
2000). Sapir and Kok both stress the utility of the Lisbon growth strategy in 
enabling cohesion through the EU economy reaching its potential.  The former 
(subsequently known simply as the “Sapir Report”) was published in July 2002 as 
a result of the President of the EC inviting a group of independent experts to 
analyse the strategic economic goals set out in the Lisbon Agenda, with follow-up 
papers in 2005 and 2006.   
The Report suggests that three pillars are in place to address the 
underperformance of the EU economy: 
1. a single market,  in order to improve economic efficiency (Single European 
Market); 
2. an effective monetary system, to ensure monetary stability (Euro-Area); 
3. an expanded Community budget, to foster cohesion (Cohesion Plans and 
Funds). 
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These main pillars of economic governance appear to be straightforward.  
However, the emphasis on completing the Single Market may undermine 
cohesion, if market-led structural adjustment is the only effective policy 
mechanism. The fixation with setting ceilings for total public budgets and budget 
deficits that do not take account of differences between the real economies, 
monetary and fiscal institutions and rules of Member States may limit the degree 
to which the objective of market efficiency by completing the SEM will be 
achieved.   
  Central to the Sapir Report and follow-ups is a six-point agenda that aims 
to help achieve the goals of Lisbon. The main objectives of this agenda are to 
make the Single Market more dynamic;  boost investment in knowledge; improve 
the macroeconomic policy framework for Economic and Monetary Union (EMU); 
redesign policies for convergence; achieve effectiveness in decision-taking and 
regulation, and; refocus the EU budget through creating three new funds: growth; 
convergence; and restructuring. The last objective seeks to integrate the EU 
budget within the framework of achieving the Lisbon goals by 2010. This is an 
interesting proposal and one that could be built on to develop a ’cohesion pact for 
the regions’.  However, the spillover effects from connecting the budget to ear-
marked funds may run counter to important constituents of one the main 
economic pillars of economic governance, namely the fiscal rules of the Euro-
Area system 
Sapir’s central thrust is that growth is the sine qua non of the EU’s 
development path.  It attempts to decompose the relative growth performance of 
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the EU’s economies compared to the United States.  But it appears to be 
selective in its use of evidence and analysis in order to substantiate this claim 
and overlooks the changing nature of the EU. It has absorbed the cohesion 
countries and the Accession States over its fifty years history: a feat of political 
will that may yet come to be seen as unparalleled.  The crucial issue, however, is 
that the manifold nature of the EU constituent economies means that direct 
comparisons with the US economy may serve no real purpose, despite this being 
the comparative reference point for EU policy makers.  Furthermore, the US has 
a fully developed institutional system of economic governance, including 
transfers between different levels of governance under the rubric of fiscal 
federalism.  Moreover, even though the ideology of the universal utility of free 
markets is dominant, the US operates a form of industrial policy for strategic 
industries, for example, aerospace, defence and ICT among others (Bailey and 
Cowling, 2006). 
From a policy perspective, a crucial part of Sapir and follow ups is how 
they deal with regional policy and consequently regional differences.  In respect 
of convergence and restructuring, Sapir recommends that cohesion policy should 
have a national and not a regional focus. However, given that within the system 
of economic governance, monetary policy is set at the EU level, and fiscal policy 
discretion of Member States is boxed in by the SGP, the spatial distribution of 
industries become a crucial component of convergence and cohesion.  Many EU 
industries are region-contingent so that industrial policy becomes central to 
regional policy, however configured.  Sapir suggests institution-building and 
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investment in human and physical capital for low-income countries, in order that 
they restructure in order to converge to EU norms.  There is no mention however, 
of the sectoral and geographical basis of either proposal.   Moreover, the Sapir 
proposals to re-focus the EU budget to an explicitly EU dimension undermines 
the logic of a country-specific approach to convergence and does not address 
the inevitable tension with an EU-wide monetary policy. Furthermore, the 
effective nationalisation of regional policy, envisaged by Sapir suggests that any 
industrial policy becomes a residual of a top-down growth qua growth strategy.  A 
’cohesion pact for the regions’ could integrate the principle of “economic 
subsidiarity” with EU level governance, within an OMC framework that co-
ordinates best practice across the Member States, whilst locating industrial policy 
within it and shifting the locus of cohesion policy from the realm of distribution to 
that of stabilisation.   
The Kok Report is much less grounded in analysis than the Sapir Report 
and reads more like an end of term report on the progress of Lisbon.  
Nevertheless, Kok remains unclear about the re-structuring of industry beyond 
repeating the Lisbon mantra of developing the ‘knowledge economy’. The 
national focus of the Kok Report (in the context of the perceived competitive 
threats from “new global players”), ignores sectoral and regional impacts across 
the EU. In many cases, these will be the same where certain industries dominate 
regional economies, but this possible conflation is not investigated.  Indeed, the 
spatial distribution and location of industry generally tends to be overlooked, with 
the exception of the role of creative industries bridging high-tech industries and 
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universities.  Even here, however, there is no distinction between the associated 
agglomeration economies despite this distinction being an important part of 
industrial policy. Furthermore, in the context of Lisbon one could say that regional 
policy is where industrial policy should sustain cohesion. Overall, it is clear that 
industrial policy suffers from the large shadow that Lisbon casts over the 
economic governance of the EU. 
 
A COHESION PACT FOR THE REGIONS? THE CONTEXT OF INDUSTRIAL 
POLICY 
The previous sections have argued that the ‘shadow of Lisbon’ over-
determined the shape and direction of cohesion policy because of the dominance 
of the growth and competitiveness agendas. Moreover, the lack of explicit 
recognition of the role of industrial policy in balancing competitiveness and 
cohesion inhibits the goals of Lisbon.  Furthermore, the drivers of economic 
governance constrain the achievement of a competitive, cohesive and 
sustainable European economy.   Perhaps surprisingly, then, industrial policy has 
made something of a comeback in the EU since 2000. An explicit recognition of 
its role is shown in a number of policy documents. In attempting to integrate 
industrial policy into a proposed regional cohesion pact, one finds a number of 
initial difficulties, though.   
Firstly, what constitutes EU industrial policy?  Throughout Lisbon, Sapir 
and Kok there is scant mention of industrial policy. In 2004 and 2005, and 
updated in 2007, a number of communications were produced by the EC on 
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industrial policy but these still seem to be over-determined by enterprise and 
competitiveness policy (EC 2004c, 2005, 2007).  The approach in 2000 was to 
develop horizontal industrial policy aimed at securing framework conditions that 
were favourable to industrial competitiveness. By 2004, the emphasis had shifted 
slightly to include the sectoral dimension and by 2005 to take account of the 
context of individual sectors, presumably including sectors that tend to be region-
specific (Aiginger and Sieber, 2006).  The new approach is a ‘matrix’ one that 
combines horizontal and vertical aspects of industrial policy. The 2007 update 
acknowledges how industrial policy will have to adapt to current and future 
challenges including the rise of new global players, facilitating more efficient 
regulation and developing new carbon technologies (EC 2007).  In spite of the 
2005 and 2007 developments, the tautological nature of EU industrial policy is 
not addressed. The following quote from the Fostering structural change: 
industrial policy in an enlarged Europe (EC, 2004c; 3) still appears to hold: 
Industrial policy also has to ensure that other policies contribute to the 
competitiveness of Europe’s industry. It therefore covers a very wide field, 
while many of its instruments are the instruments of other policy fields. 
Industrial competitiveness depends on policies such as competition, the 
internal market, research and development, education, trade and 
sustainable development.  
 
One can see that industrial policy is almost entirely driven by Lisbon 
reinforcing the contention that EU industrial policy is squeezed between the rock 
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of competitiveness policy and the hard place of entrepreneurship policy.  As 
noted by Bailey et al (2007), the Sapir prescriptions were found wanting in the 
case of Ireland, even through Sapir appears to cite the Irish economy as the 
ideal-typical model for the EU.  Without a sophisticated industrial policy much of 
the Irish success story going back two decades might not have been sustained.  
The inevitable question is what are the attributes of industrial policy and what 
should be its components in an EU setting? Pelksman summaries the wide 
scope of EU industrial policy as shown in Figure 1 below (Pelksman, 2006).   
 
--- Figure 1 around here --- 
 
The concept and mantra of competitiveness still dogs much of the policy 
debates around the economic development of EU as expressed in the Lisbon 
Agenda.  In addition, recent contributions on competitiveness are still 
characterised by disagreement over conception and context. In a large part, 
discussion of this elusive concept is still overshadowed by the work of Porter who 
conflates two types of competitiveness into one category (Budd and Hirmis, 
2004).  There have been subsequent attempts to clarify the elusive beast by 
focusing on industrial competitiveness within an EU context (Bailey et al, 2006, 
Grilo and Koopman, 2006, Kohler, 2006). The utility of these interventions 
notwithstanding, the pursuit of an elusive concept that is frequently 
misunderstood by policy makers can have create perverse outcomes for policy. 
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As Pelksman (2006: 140) wryly observes, competitiveness almost becomes a 
cure for all economic ills:  
Competitiveness is now so widely defined that it serves as a ‘container, in 
which almost any idea can be dumped. Not only are ill-defined policies 
rarely good policies, the nebulous approach acts as an open invitation for 
(industrial) lobbies and national ministers to argue attention to almost 
anything, resulting in waves of ‘fashionable’  
topics. 
 
Pelskman goes on to describe how industrial policy at the symbolic level went out 
of fashion in the mid-1990s to be replaced by competitiveness policy. The crucial 
issue about EU industrial policy in respect of Lisbon is spelt out by Bailey and 
Cowling (2006: 27): 
Overall, there has been quite extensive public policy intervention in the 
United States, but this is often opaque and hidden. This industrial policy 
has involved both vertical measures in targeting new technologies and 
emerging industries, and horizontal measures to support all industries, 
suggesting that the current focus in Britain and the EU with the horizontal 
aspects of industrial policy has been largely misplaced. This may have 
relevance in the European context, given the desire to re-activate the EU’s 
‘Lisbon agenda’. 
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    Their comment is pertinent in assessing the role of industrial policy in 
balancing economic governance in the EU. Perhaps the most overlooked aspect 
in discussions of industrial policy is policy which directly bears on industry. In 
Pelksman’s original paper the figure above included policies that affect industry 
under the rubric of “buffering industry”. This rubric includes monetary and fiscal 
policy, wage setting and industrial relations, among others, and non-industrial 
policy measures “directly affecting industry”. The original  horizontal and 
framework nature of post-Lisbon EU industrial policy would appear to be 
consistent with achieving the aims of Lisbon. How this type of policy plays out in 
different regions and sectors is almost entirely determined by policies that affect 
industry however.  The new ‘matrix’ approach may go some way to resolving this 
tension. Pelksman (2006) identifies three cross-cutting issues expressed in the 
following questions: 
• Does EU industrial policy amount to ‘competitiveness’ policies? 
• Do services matter for industry? 
• What can Europe do about infrastructure and how critical is that for 
industrial policy?  
He could have added to these questions the cross-cutting role of cohesion policy 
and exploring them within a regional framework.  All these cross-cutting issues 
can be located within a ’cohesion pact for the regions’. The starting point for such 
a pact is an appropriate policy framework. One that lends itself here is the OMC 
approach. The latter attempts to integrate the operations of EU-level and 
Member State policy processes more flexibility and consists of: 
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1. subjecting national policies to EU-wide guidelines; 
2. establishing measures of best practice against which the performance of 
Member States can be compared; 
3. calling on Member States to adopt action plans in order to operationalise 
EU guidelines; 
In this regard, Begg (2003; 177) notes the potential of the OMC approach: 
Following the example of employment policy, the starting-point would be 
to set out objectives for both regional development and equity. 
Governments would then be asked to put forward comprehensive 
strategies for achieving these objectives, to commit themselves to meeting 
target, and to show how national and EU-level policy instruments 
contribute to the policy aims. 
 
Begg also observes that the OMC approach depends on the political will of the 
Member States within a framework without means of enforcement. He refers to 
suggestion that the ‘soft law agreements’ of OMC could be reinforced by EU-
level agreements Scharpf (2002). Given the extension of the OMC approach into 
other areas of policy, including economic re-structuring, it appears to be relevant 
for integrating industrial policy into processes for balancing competitiveness and 
cohesion.  A ’cohesion pact for the regions’ could then operate along the 
following lines: 
1. Create an OMC governance framework in which the key institutions and 
actors of the EU, Member States and regional governing bodies sign up 
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for and are integrated into the management of operations of a cohesion 
pact.  This would include the Committee for the Regions at the EU level 
and the regional governments and institutions of governance within the 
Members States, among others. The institutional basis of the Pact would 
be the locus for discussions of how industrial regional and cohesion policy 
are integrated more effectively. Within soft law agreements, explicit 
recognition would be given to the role of EU industrial policy in balancing 
competitiveness and cohesion and its activation at the sectoral level 
through the creation of new regionally-based financial instruments. The 
hard rules of monetary policy and the SGP would be made more flexible, 
taking into to account different monetary and fiscal characteristics and 
institutions, and the economic path dependencies of the Member States 
through better integration of the Broad Economic Guidelines. There has 
been considerable debates and a number of reform proposals made in 
this area (Begg and Schelkle, 2004)  This reform would supplemented by 
the introduction of a system of fiscal federalism at the regional level that 
would correspond to a soft law agreement,  with benchmarks and mutual 
learning from best practice in Member States with developed federal or 
decentralised governmental systems 
2.  Developing the Sapir proposals for budgetary reform based on the three 
funds of growth, re-structuring and convergence. Financial instruments 
hypothecated for individual sectors and ones that are particularly region-
contingent would be developed within the proposed system of fiscal 
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federalism. Hypothecating funds for the restructuring and growth of 
strategic industries through the development of regional bond markets, 
underwritten by EU funds, is one possibility. This might create a virtuous 
circle in that the financial instruments used to fund industrial policy 
interventions could create financial and business services associated with 
the development and operation of localised bond markets and different 
circuits of capital. Moreover, this outcome would connect services into an 
industrial policy framework in a more holistic manner. 
3.  The OMC framework would coordinate the establishment of benchmarks, 
best practice and mutual learning in integrating industrial policy, regional 
policy and cohesion policy, again subject to the hard constraint of a more 
flexible EU monetary policy and SGP within the context of completing the 
SEM and effective management of the expansion of the EU.  
 The major challenge is the last one, that is, the degree to which the 
macroeconomic benefits of EMU, the SEM  and the accompanying fruits of 
economic growth can be more evenly distributed in an expanding EU within a 
’cohesion pact for the regions’. Moreover, how regions whose path dependencies 
continue to make them vulnerable to structural change and economic volatility 
are cohered within a larger EU is a major challenge to policy makers at all 
governmental levels.  In spite of the regional disdain displayed in the Sapir and 
Kok Reports, the region remains the locus of how growth and cohesion agendas 
are balanced.  In this balancing act, the incorporation of industrial policy into a 
‘cohesion pact for the regions’ appears to provide the framework and policy 
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instruments to overcome the drawbacks of an asymmetrical regime of economic 
governance in the EU. 
 
CONCLUSION  
The promise of the 2000 Lisbon Agenda to make Europe the most dynamic 
economy in the world by 2010 appears to have faded.  Lisbon Mark II reads 
rather like end of year school report (“Must Try Harder”), but still omits any critical 
discourse on the EU’s development, particularly one that appears to be 
weakened by the enlargement to twenty seven Members States and possibly 
more in the future.  The shadow of Lisbon continues to dominate the policy field 
in the EU, and although Sapir and Kok contain some useful proposals for making 
the regime of economic governance more flexible, the asymmetric nature of this 
regime constrains significant reform.  
 The reification of the knowledge economy and advancing it through growth 
and competitiveness agendas in order to generate higher aggregate demand 
overlooks the diverse nature of the EU’s economies and industrial structures. 
The emphasis on EU-wide growth, sui generis, ignores important different spatial 
structures and path dependencies.  Indeed competitiveness has become a 
container into which any nebulous idea and policy response can be thrown.  The 
essential problem is that Lisbon and its antecedents assume that 
competitiveness and cohesion can be balanced but do not address how this is to 
be achieved. The neglect of explicit industrial policy, until its very recent revival, 
had removed one important policy sphere in which these potentially conflicting 
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objectives could be made more mutual.  Unfortunately, the previous stress on 
horizontal/framework industrial policy has tended to make this conflict more 
difficult to resolve as it tends to privilege competitiveness over cohesion. 
Moreover, the Sapir Report’s emphasis on declining nations and not regions 
constrains the role of a more comprehensive industrial policy in this regard, 
particularly at the regional level. By locating industrial policy within a regional 
framework, important economic stabilisers can be created to manage asymmetric 
shocks arising out of the transmission of a uniform EU monetary policy.  In 
combination with a system of fiscal federalism, some of the negative aspects of 
the EU’s regime of asymmetric governance can be addressed.   Within an OMC 
policy framework these elements would form the basics of what we term a 
’cohesion pact for the regions’.  
  At present, there is no explicit cohesion plan for Accession States 
experiencing uneven development. Without a clear regional commitment, 
expansion is less likely to be cohesive than previously.  In the present economic 
environment, global developments are playing out differentially, defeating any 
notion of ‘Europe of the Regions’. The political consequences of these 
weaknesses could potentially destabilise the next stage of the EU project.  A 
flexible and more balanced approach to the economic governance of the EU, 
which activates policy instruments at all levels of governance, could make a 
significant contribution to achieving the objectives of growth and cohesion under 
the Lisbon Agenda. This will only occur if there is an explicit recognition of the 
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role of a more comprehensive industrial policy operating at a regional level and 
one not subscribing to the dominant discourse of the “knowledge economy”. 
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Figure 1: Elements of Industrial Policy in the European Union 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Broad concept of 
Industrial Policy 
Framework Aspects Horizontal industrial 
Policy 
Sectoral/specific 
industrial policy 
-  Setting up of SEM (EU) 
-  Functioning of SEM (EU) 
   > harmonisation (lack 
    of) 
   > lack of standards & C.A. 
   > removal of distortions 
- Competition policy (EU/MS) 
   > state aids 
   > network industries 
- Regional/ cohesion policies  
  (general) (EU/MS) 
- Better regulation (EU/MS) 
- State ownership (MS) 
   
- Research strategies  
  (MS/EU) 
- Innovation stimulus (MS/EU) 
- Entrepreneurship & risk  
   Capital (MS/EU) 
-  Skills & human capital (MS) 
-  Restructuring funds  
   MS/EU) 
-  Competitiveness tests for  
    other policies (EU) 
-  Public procurement  
   (MS/EU) 
- Sectoral interventions  
   (--EU) 
- Sector policies 
   (-- EU; EU/MS) 
- Clusters & industrial  
   filieres policy (MS) 
- Trade policy (EU) 
- Specific aspects of   
   regional/cohesion  
    policies (EU/MS) 
- Technology policies  
   (EU/MS) 
- Defence procurement (MS) 
 
Key:   SEM = Single European Market  EU    = EU powers 
 C.A. = Conformity Assessment   MS   =  Member States’ powers 
 EU   =  Strict EU constraints with little  EU/MS  = Shared powers 
Member States’ leeway              MS/EU = Shared powers but mainly  
   national 
Source: Pelksman (2006) 
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END NOTES 
 
                                                
1 Open University Business School, Open University. I am grateful for comments on this 
paper by John Parr, David Bailey and two anonymous referees. 
2 Institutional embeddedness refers to the degree to which regional economic 
development benefits from the interaction of local institutions and their degree of 
governance power. 
3 Hypothecation is the process whereby fiscal instruments are used for particular policy 
objectives. For example, in the UK the revenue gained by local authorities from imposing 
residential parking charges can only be used for transport improvements. 
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